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I. Introduction
The aim of this paper is mainly to suggest that quanti-
fication in natural languages is a phenomenon of much greater
generality and importance than is usually assumed. According
to the traditional view, quantifiers are regarded as a class
of expressions associated with certain noun phrases; some
authors understand them to be determiners like some , all ,
many , while others identify quantifers with whole noun
phrases. The latter view was adopted by Montague in PTQ (1974)
and was recently generalized by Barwise and Cooper (1981).
Quantification, however, is by no means a phenomenon restric-
ted to the category of noun phrases and I would like to pre-
sent some examples which, I hope, will illustrate the idea of
generality I have in mind. 1)
 It turns out that there are also
quantifiers in the categories of adverbs, adjectives and verbs,
and that a greater part of them, if not all, have a very speci-
fic semantical structure in common.
Another, secondary, aim of this paper is to put more em-
phasis on the notion of duality, which is intrinsically connec-
ted with quantification.
II. Duality
In accordance with Barwise and Cooper (1981) I define
quantifiers as one place second order predicates of the logi-
cal type c 'a ,t>,t> , a being any type whatsoever. For a=e
this is the type of noun phrases in. PTQ, if one neglects in-
tensionality. Examples are not only natural language noun
phrases (and other expressions), -but also, of course, the
usual quantifiers of predicate logic.
Given any quantifier Q, there is a set of three others
which are associated with Q by inner and outer negation:
AP (-Q (P)) , AP (Q (--P) ) , and AP NQ (~ P) , or -Q, Q'' , and - Q ,-• in
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a less formal notation. Thus, any quantifier is a member of
a complete square of quantifiers:
inner negation
Q
outer
negation
dual 	 outer
negation
inner negation
fig.1
The square is closed in the sense that any of the four members
generates the same whole scheme. While there are no special
terms for inner and outer negation, the relationship of being
the outer negation of the inner negation (or vice versa) of
a certain quantifier is called duality. Q and ^,Q- are dual,
as are -Q and Q-.
The standard example of dual operators are the existential
and the universal quantifiers of predicate logic.They are dual
to each other, because Vx is the same as ^-3x-, and 3x as -Vx-.
The concept of duality is normally only used in order to
define one of the quantifiers in terms of the other and thereby
reduce the number of logical primitives. In the study of nat-
ural language quantification, however, duality turns out to be
a notion of considerable -practical value.
The relationship of duality can only obtain between quan-
tifiers, not between predicates of different kinds, because
the notion of inner and outer negation is characteristical for
one place second order predicates. Duality and quantification
are equivalent concepts in that Q is a quantifier if and
only if it has a dual counterpart. Thus, for the study of
natural languages duality is useful in two different ways.
Firstly as a heuristic device: any operator which has a dual
will be a quantifier. Secondly as a means to reduce the amount
of analytical work to be done: once a formal analysis for one
quantifier is established it yields at the same time a proper
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semantical description of the remaining three members of the
duality scheme.
So far as my preliminary studies have progressed, it turns
out, that of any square of quantifiers which is partly or
wholly lexicalized in a natural language usually at least two
members are in the lexicon, often three, and occasionally four.
If it is only two, then they are dual (if it is more than two,
then there is trivially a pair of duals among them). Thus
duality in fact works very well as a heuristic criterion to
find quantifiers, and it actually helps to reduce the number
of single lexical item analyses. A further advantage of taking.
duality in account is a methodological one: if the analysis
of a certain quantifier is to be valid for one, two, or three
others at the same time, it is bound to be more accurate,
because it can be checked in the respective number of differ
ent ways.
III. Examples
Without representing the full range of instances of
quantifiers I have found so far I shall analyse four groups
which lie semantically and syntactically sufficiently far
apart in order to give some sense of the generality intended.
There are some studies in the literature about some or all
expressions treated here, but this is not the place to discuss
them.
. already, still, not yet, not anymore 
In the following analysis I am going to treat only those uses
of already and its associates, in which the adverb can be under-
stood as an operator an a time-dependent durative statement.
Such statements are evaluated with respect to a certain temporal
reference point t°, at which it is already/still/... the case
that p.
The outer negation of already is not yet. Consider the
equivalence of (1) and(2):
(1) It is not the case that she is asleep already.
(2) She is not asleep yet.
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Let us assume for the sake of simplicity that the negation of
she is asleep is just she is awake, without any transition
states (a simplification, which will not affect the validity
of the subsequent analysis).Then, the pairs (3) and (4), and
(5) and (6) mean the same:
(3) Sheds asleep alreay. 	 already p
(4) She is not awake anymore. 	 not anymore Pop
(5) She is not asleep yet.	 not yet p.
(6) She is still awake.	 still ",p.
Apparently not anymore amounts to the inner negation of
already and still to the one of not yet. Thus still is the
inner negation of the outer negation of already, i.e. its
dual. Consequently still is also the outer negation of not 
anymore, which is correct: (4) means the same as
(7) It is not the case that she is still awake.
Let me represent the meaning relationships established now in
two alternative schemes:
inner negation
ALREADY <	 NOT ANYMORE       
outer
negation dual
outer
negation   
NOT YET <	 > STILL 
inner negation
fig.2
ALREADY P	 NOT ANYMORE "ilD
NOT YET p	 " STILL-P
fig.3
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I assume that both already p and not yet p have the same pre-
supposition, namely that a phase of —p which has begun some
time before t° might be followed by a phase of p. Then the
point of the question "already p or not yet p?" is whether
or not the endpoint of that phase of 	 is reached.
The same meaning relationship obtains between still and
not anymore, the difference being that both statements pre-
suppose the opposite condition that there is a phase of p
which hase begun before t° and may or may not have ended yet.
If there is a phase of p which has begun ealier than t°,
then it has a starting point (which in some cases may be the
beginning of the time scale). Let me call this point LESP(p,t°)
- read "latest earlier starting point of a phase of p before
t°". The meanings of the four operators can be illustrated by
the following diagrams:
LESP(p,t°)
t°
I
NInmnIi46*•
t°
-P
already p
not yet p
still p
not anymore p
LESP(--p,t°)	 -p
1
t°
LESP(-p,t°)	 -p
t°
LESP(p,t°)
fig.4
The precise definition of LESP(p,t°) is as follows:
If there is any phase of p which begins earlier than t°, then
LESP(p,t°) is the starting point of the latest such phase.
Otherwise LESP(p,t°) is undefined.
The informal results pictured in fg.4 can be expressed
by the following formulas. t is a variable over points of time,
and the proposition p is understood as an one place predicate
over points of time, p(t) meaning "p obtains at t".
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(already p)o
	
.	 at (LESP (",p,t°) 4 t t°	 p(t))
(not yet p) t° =
 "'3t(LESP(...p,t°) 4 t 4, t° & p(t) )
(not anymore p) t° =	 3t(LESP(p,t°) < t 4 t°	 "p (t) )
(still p) to	 . ma' 3t (LESP (p,t°) < t t° & ATM )
Note that in the case of inner negation both occurences of p
are to be negated.
The analysis can still be maintained if there is a trans-
ition phase between p and "op during which neither p nor 'p is
the case. It is presuppositional in a slightly hidden way, in
that the presuppositions mentioned above enter the formulas
in the form of the conditions under which the term LESP refers.
2. begin, continue, end
Another, similar set of quantifiers are the verbs begin, continue 
and end, which I am going to treat prototypically as proposi-
tional operators of the same semantical type as already.
(begin p) t o , for instance, is to be read as "a phase of p
begins at t°".
The relationships of the duality scheme are easily estab-
lished. Apparently the beginning of p means the end of "fp
while p continues if and only if it does not end:
inner negation
CONTINUE 	
 NOT BEGIN    
outer
negation dual
outer
negation    
END 
	 BEGIN 
inner negation	 fig.5
Again the pairs of expressions connected by outer negation
have opposite presuppositions:(continue p) t . and (end p) t o both
presuppose the existence of a phase of p beginning earlier than
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t° and lasting at least till this point of time, whereas
(begin p) t o can only be true or false when there is a phase
of	 with that property. If we have such a phase of p (or ~p)
then it either extends forever or it is followed by an opposite
phase. Let me define ELEP(p,t°) - read "earliest later end-
point of a phase of p after t°"- not quite literally in the
following way:
If there is any phase of .wp which lasts till at least t°,
then ELEP(p,t°) is the endpoint of the immediately succeeding
phase of p, or the end of time, if there is no such succeeding
phase. Otherwise ELEP(p,t°) is undefined.
Thus ELEP(p,t°) is defined if and only if the presuppositions
of (begin p) t o are fulfilled. We get the following illustrating
diagrams which look similar to the ones of fig.4.
t°
ELEP  ,t° )
end p
continue p
not begin p
begin p  
t°
INIMIIIIMIn11111n111.4111
t°  
t°  
fig.6 
The corresponding formulas are:
	
(continue p)to	 3t(t°< t ELEP(..p,t°) & p(t))
	
(begin p) to	 ^,3t(t°< t 4ELEP(p,t°) & ~p(t))	 (dual)
(end p) t o is just the inner negation of (begin p) t o. The
fourth member of the square is the outer negation of begin,
for which there is no simple verb in the lexicon.
The three verbs analyzed here represent the classical three
verbal aspects durative, inchoative, and perfective. Thus, seem-
ingly verbal aspect too belongs to the realm of quantification.
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3.	 ... enough, too . • •
My next example will be the pair of expressions enough 
and too in the following uses:
x° is (ADJ) enough
x° is too (ADJ)
The operators can also be used on certain adverbs, but their
meaning is essentially the same in both cases. Duality rela-
tions can not be established in an informal way but rather
turn out to be the result of the following formal analysis.
What looks at a first glance like a duality, namely equivalences
like
(8)	 big enough = not too small
is actually an only similar relationship, because small and
big are not negations but contraries of each other.
ADJ in the scope of these operators can not be any ad-
jective whatsoever, but has to be a scaling adjective (which
has a comparative and superlative form, or can be prefixed
with more and most). Scaling adjectives like big or heavy 
and their contraries refer to conceptual dimensions of objects,
like size or weight. Any object of the appropriate semantical
class has a certain value on the scale of possible sizes, weights
etc. the same way as it has certain time and space coordinates
if it is a physical substance. (cf. LObner (1979) and (1981)
for a more detailed discussion of the notion of conceptual
dimension). What is characteristical for scaling adjectives
is the feature that the range of possible values exhibits a
linear ordering, like time. Scaling adjectives usually have an
antonym and the scale of values is divided into three regions
or phases. It is crucial for the semantics of this class of
adjectives, that there are three and not only two subregions
(cf. e.g. Kitcher 1978). Fig.7:
negative	 neutral	 positiv
MIN	 MAX
'low'
'bad' neither nor
'high'
'good'
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The negative and the positive part can be distinguished
independently by the fact, that the negative antonym is marked,
while the positive is not.
Within the whole scale of values given by the adjective in
their scope the quantifiers enough and too presuppose that
there is a certain range of acceptable values in the middle
of the scale, say "Acc":
	> • • . enough  
cc
MIN
Acc
acceptable
fig.8
too . • •
-,Acc
MAX 
Both the scale itself and the acceptability range depend
on the context in a complex manner (cf. e.g. Pinkal 1977), which
need not be discussed here. The meanings of the four quantifiers.
... enough and too ... with their respective negations are
(almost) perfectly analogous to those of the already-group, a
fact which can be illustrated by the following paraphrases
(here already etc. refer to the scale of sizes, not of time):
big enough	 =	 already
not big enough =	 not yet
acceptable in size
not too big
	 =	 still
too big	 =	 not anymore,
The difference lies in the fact that something can be both big
enough and too big at one time. There is no upper bound for
enough, and likewise no lower bound for too, while there are
such bounds for already and still. The formal analysis is
almost the same:
x° is ADJ enough = 3x (Min ('MAcc) x x°	 Acc (x) )
x° is too ADJ	 = 3x (Min (Acc) <	 x° &
	 (x) )
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Acc is the range of acceptable values with respect to the rele-
vant context, Min( .‘,Acc) is the minimum of the union of both
ranges of non-acceptability, i.e. the minimum of the whole
scale itself, and < is the ordering of the scale,> meaning
exactly the same as the comparative of the adjective.
If ADJ is replaced by its antonym ADJ- , the scale and
the acceptability range remain unchanged, while the
ordering is reversed. On the basis of the analysis given, the
equivalence of ADJ enough and not too ADJ can easily be
proved.
4. Scaling adjectives 
Obviously it is possible to analyze scaling adjectives
themselves in the same way. It is comonly understood that scal-
ing adjectives are relative in the sense that a sentence of
the form a is ADJ is to be read as a is ADJ as .... The
subject, together with other relevant features of the context
determines the scale of values and its tripartition. Again
the analysis which I propose is not affected by the usual
vagueness of the division. Let DI ("non-neutral",cf. the black
regions in fig.7) be the union of the negative and the positive
range, ADJ + a positive, unmarked, scaling adjective, and ADJ
its antonym, if there is any. The formal analysis, then, would
be
is ADJ + 	3x(min (ell() < x x° &	 (x)
x° is ADJ	 4.•3x (MIN (X) < x x° & Nd (x)
In both cases < is the same ordering in the natural direction.
Antonyms are dual according to this, a point that cannot be
demonstrated in an informal way, because the quantified predic-
ate $ is not overt in the sentence.
The analysis offered here is the only one I know which
renders the proper meaning relationship between antonyms. On
the other hand, of course, it is much more complicated than
the simple approach which treats these adjectives essentially
as first order predicates.
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IV. Phase quantification as . a general concept 
•
The four cases analyzed so far can be considered instances
of a general pattern, which I would like to call phase quanti-
fication. They all exhibit a strikingly similar semantical
structure, although they do not look very much alike at the
first glance. If one compares
(already p) t o	 3t(LESP(-dp,t°) <t	 & p(t))
(continue p) tc,	 =	 3t(t°4 t (ELEP("ip,t°)	 p(t))
x° is ADJ enough	 =	 3x( Min(^'Acc) < x ‘x°	 Acc (x) )
x° is ADJ +	 =	 3x( Min(" d) 4 x	 & $(x))
then the common structure is
Qx0(p)	 =	 3x (min ( P4p,x°) < x max ( ..vp,x°) & p (x)
with the following ingredients:
- a certain scale of values of the variable x, which are
of the same type as:
- a point of reference	 on that scale.
a predicate p that is "quantified"
- quantification restricted to an interval (min(dvp,x°),
max(^,p,x°)] , which is open on the left and closed on the
right side; one of its endpoints is always x°, while the
other is the minimum or maximum of phase of .vp that is
related to x° in a specific way.
Two quantifier groups, those of already  and continue,
have certain presuppositions. In these cases, the phase of
AT which is relevant for the restricting condition of the
quantifier, depends on x°. In the other two cases, where no
presuppositions are involved, min/max(-,p,x°) is actually in-
dependent from the fixpoint x°.
The fact that there is astructure common to all cases
analyzed so far shows that parts of natural language quanti
fication exhibit highly specific characteristics. The notion
of phase quantification can, however, be lent further weight
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by the observation that the ordinary restricted quantifiers
of predicate logic themselves can be conceived in this way.
Most likely the semantics of all the operators like some ,
sometimes, some time, somewhere, can, possible, to let and
many others are reducible to ordinary restricted quantifiers
over appropriate fields of individuals, points or stretches
of time, places, possibilities etc. Now, the ordinary restricted
quantifier
3x(A(x)	 P(x) )
can be equivalently expressed by quantification about sets
instead of individuals:
3X(C6 c X CA & P2 X) .
A simple proof shows that the proper inner negation is just
3X(95 c X A & (NP) 2X)
with ^iP being the set theoretical complement of P.
With regard to the partial ordering of set inclusion, 0
is the minimum of both P and NP when conceived as the range
of their subsets. Thus we get again a formula very similar to
other instances of phase quantification:
3x (min ( ,.,P) c xcA	 X c P)
A last generalization which comprises both. X S P and x e p
yields
ax (min ( .,p,x°) < x max ( . p,x°) & p{x})
	as the final general form. In this case 	 is to be taken
as the respective predication relation, p{ x} meaning: p holds
for x. To generalize the predication relation seemingly weakens
the strength of the uniformity assumption, but nevertheless
might be advantageous in several regards. Firstly, it leaves
open the controverse question whether temporal predicates
should apply to points or rather to periods of time. Secondly,
a uniform treatment of distributive and collective predicates
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seems possible along these lines. And thirdly, mass noun quant-
ification might as well be treated in this form by means of
a special predication relation meaning "x is a quantity of p".
All these conjectures, of course, have to be studied care-
fully before any general hypotheses can be established. I hope,
however, that I have managed to suggest conclusively that
quantification in the general sense comprises considerable
parts of natural language and at the same time exhibits a common
semantical structure which is specific enough to expose non-
trivial traits of natural language semantics.
Notes
1 There have been several proposals in the literature to regard expressions
other than noun phrases as quantifiers (cf. Verkuyl 1973, Lewis 1975,
Kratzer 1977). But the approach I am going to develop is more comprehensive.
2 In the analysis here I neglect that already is often used to express that
p has started earlier than expected, which is an additional, perhaps de-
rivable meaning of the adverb.
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